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ON HUMAN CLONING:
REVISITING SAFETY AS A
MORAL CONSTRAINT
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I. INTRODUCTION

In its June 1997 report, the National Bioethics Advisory Commission
(NBAC) concluded that the application of somatic cell nuclear transfer
technologies to human cloning is morally unacceptable at this time.' Given the
current state of cloning research, this conclusion is based mainly on concerns of
safety for the gestational mother and for "the fetus and/or potential child" 2
being cloned. 3 Thus, safety functions, in this case, as an overriding moral
constraint. In the words of James Childress, ethicist and member of the
Commission, safety is a "fundamental ethical consideration . . . . Any
procedure that creates a substantial risk of harm to children is morally
problematic."' It is one issue on which a remarkable consensus exists among
members of the NBAC, while, not unexpectedly, a plurality of views exists on
the question of whether cloning ought to be permitted once safety concerns have
been adequately addressed.
The NBAC's report also includes a chapter summarizing a number of
(Western) "Religious Perspectives" on the prospect of cloning humans. 5 It is
based on reports submitted either in writing to or in testimony before the
Commission by scholars of the Jewish, Christian, and Islamic traditions and by
religious leaders in these traditions. As noted in the report's chapter on
religious perspectives, religious views on the ethics of human cloning reveal as
. Ph.D., Emory University, 1995; Director, Center for Ethics in Health Care, Atlanta, Georgia.
1. NATIONAL BIOETHIcs ADVISORY COMMISSION, CLONING HUMAN BEINGS: REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION 108 (1997) [hereinafter

NBAC REPORT]. Unless otherwise noted, all references to human cloning in this article are to
somatic cell nuclear transfer cloning, the specific type of cloning on which the NBAC's report
focused.
2. Id.
3. This conclusion implies, of course, that such cloning might go forward in the future, without
undue moral concern, once the question of safety is adequately addressed; indeed, this implication
is discussed explicitly in the report's legislative recommendations. Id. at 109.
4. James F. Childress, The Challenges'of Public Ethics: Reflections on NBA C's Report,
HASTINGS CTR. REP., Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 9.
S. NBAC REPORT, supra note 1, at 39-61.
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much plurality as secular views, though they also reveal a similar consensus on
the question of safety. Thus, some religious leaders and scholars argue-on
religious grounds-that human cloning could be morally acceptable under certain
circumstances, assuming that the circumstances under which it would be morally
acceptable adequately account for the safety of the gestational mother and the
fetus or potential child being cloned. However, other scholars and religious
leaders argue that human cloning would be wrong under any circumstances or,
as it is sometimes said, human cloning is intrinsically wrong. 6 Yet, even their
argument is not that safety is an unimportant moral constraint. Rather, they
argue that human cloning is wrong even if it could be shown to be safe or, said
more precisely, at least as safe as natural reproduction.
This Article considers the moral constraint that this concern for safety
represents, primarily as Christian ethicists and moral theologians use the concept
of safety to construct moral arguments for or against human cloning and only
as it (allegedly) applies to the so-called "potential child" being cloned. With
respect to the potential child being cloned, this Article argues that safety cannot,
in fact, coherently be used as a moral constraint. The safety of the gestational
mother is not problematic in the same way that the potential child's safety is
problematic, and thus this Article does not address it. The concern for the
safety of the developing (cloned) fetus is another issue, important as it is, that
this Article does not address. It turns on a related but distinct question that
concerns the moral status of biological entities which emerge at various stages
of early human development and are only arguably considered persons or are
due the regard typically given to persons. This Article will discuss the moral
status of these developing entities only to the extent needed to demonstrate how
that status complicates, but does not permit us to sidestep, questions involving
potential children as such.
In revisiting this particular moral constraint, this Article will not argue
normatively that human cloning is morally either acceptable or unacceptable.
Rather, this Article argues that those Christian moral arguments that would
permit human cloning, on the assumption that the question of safety has been
adequately addressed, are undermined by a problem that is completely ignored
in the NBAC's discussion of "Religious Perspectives" on human cloning, and
mentioned only in passing in its discussion of the "Ethical Considerations"
related to human cloning. 7 Moreover, those Christian moral arguments that
prohibit human cloning under any circumstances and do not depend on safety are
undermined by the same problem because the problem undermines our ability

6. All commentators also agreed that any child brought into existence through cloning ought
to be regarded as a human person. For a discussion of this point, see Childress, supra note 4, at
11.
7. NBAC REPORT, supra note 1, at 66.
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to make any direct moral reference to the potential child who might be cloned.
In essence, this Article will argue that religiously-based moral arguments, both
for and against human cloning, are undermined in principle because they do not
properly account for this problem. 8
II.

THE PROBLEM OF CONTINGENT FUTURE PERSONS

The "problem," ignored in the NBAC's discussion of "Religious
Perspectives" and mentioned only in passing in its discussion of "Ethical
Considerations," was defined as a problem only in 1967, 9 and is thus relatively
novel. This problem is discussed in the literature under a number of different
and sometimes provocative names. Gregory S. Kavka discusses it as the
"futurity problem" and as "the paradox of future individuals"; 0 Thomas
Schwartz discusses it as "the problem of the disappearing beneficiaries";" R.
M. Hare discusses it as a problem of "possible people"; 2 Derek Parfit
discusses it as "the non-identity problem";' 3 and David Heyd discusses it as a
"genesis problem."'" I call it the problem of contingent future persons. 5 It
arises when we are considering whether to bring a potential child-or, as I
typically say, a "contingent future person"-into existence under certain
conditions (to be specified below). Under these conditions, the problem of
contingent future persons makes it impossible to assert coherently that such a
child has been harmed or benefited by being brought into existence.

8. Secular moral arguments about human cloning that assume safety as a moral constraint, while
not considered here, are undermined in the same way if their fundamental approach to value is
"person-affecting" or "person-oriented." Here, I am assuming without argument that Western
religious traditions are person-affecting or person-oriented in their fundamental approach to value.
In support of this assumption for the Jewish and Christian traditions, see David Heyd, Divine
Creation and Human Procreation:Reflections on Genesis in the Light of Genesis, in CONTINGENT
FUTURE PERSONS: ON THE ETHICS OF DECIDING WHO WILL LIVE, OR NOT, IN THE FUTURE 57-70

(Nick Fotion & Jan C. Heller eds., 1997); Jan C. Heller, Deciding the Timing of Children: An
Ethical Challenge Only Indirectly Addressed by the Christian Tradition, in CONTINGENT FUTURE
PERSONS: ON THE ETHICS OF DECIDING WHO WILL LIVE, OR NOT, IN THE FUTURE 71-84 (Nick

Fotion & Jan C. Heller eds., 1997).
9. Jan Narveson, Utilitarianismand New Generations, 76 MIND 62 (1967).
10. Gregory S. Kavka, The Futurity Problem, in OBLIGATIONS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS 180203 (R.I. Sikora & Brian Barry eds., 1978); Gregory S. Kavka, The Paradoxof FutureIndividuals,
11 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 93-112 (1982).
11. Thomas Schwartz, Obligationsto Posterity, in OBLIGATIONS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS 3-13
(R.I. Sikora & Brian Barry eds., 1978).
12. See R.M. Hare, Possible People, 2 BIOETHICS 279-93 (1988).
13. Derek Parfit, The Non-identity Problem, in REASONS AND PERSONS 351-79 (1984)
[hereinafter REASONS AND PERSONS].
14. DAVID HEYD, GENETHICS: MORAL ISSUES IN THE CREATION OF PEOPLE (1992).
15. See JAN CHRISTIAN HELLER, HUMAN GENOME RESEARCH AND THE CHALLENGE OF
CONTINGENT FUTURE PERSONS (1996).
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The future child in question is potential or contingent in the sense that its
future existence, and thus its identity, depends on the choices or actions of the
relevant agents in question. This situation arises, claims Derek Parfit, because
identity is time-dependent. By claiming that identity is time-dependent, Parfit
means that the identities of particular people necessarily depend on when they
were conceived.' 6
This fact may not be morally problematic for most
prospective parents, but it could be under circumstances like those that surround
human cloning. Here, I want merely to suggest, in an intuitive sense, how such
circumstances arise and what far-reaching implications they hold by considering
a case that Parfit develops but in a slightly altered form. 7
Because of what we now know about reproductive biology, Parfit argues
we can reasonably assert the following: if a couple (Parfit considers a teenage
mother) deliberately decides to delay the conception of a potential child in order
to increase the chances that it will have a "better start" or better opportunities
in life, say, once the couple is better off financially, a different child will
actually be born when they do conceive and bring the child to term (assuming
that the child's gestation and birth are unproblematic). However, because a
different child is actually born in such situations, it makes no sense to claim that
this particular child has benefited by not being born earlier. For if the couple
had not delayed conception, this child would not exist. Said differently, no*
earlier "state of being" existed to which this particular child's life can now be
compared. Conversely, and more controversially, if the same couple, under the
same conditions, decides not to delay conception, it also makes no sense to
claim that the child actually brought into existence has been harmed by being
born earlier, that is, by being born with fewer opportunities in life. Again, if
its parents had delayed this child's conception, a different child would have been
born, and this particular child would not exist.' 8
This apparent inability to attribute benefit or harm to the effects of choices
or actions that bring children into existence is the problem of contingent future
persons. It is perplexing ethically, for it seems to remove the welfare-and
thus, the safety-of these children from all moral consideration, at least to the
extent that their welfare is determined by those choices or actions that bring

16. Parfit, supra note 13, at 351-53. This is not, of course, a claim that personal identity can
be reduced to the genetic make-up of a person that is (largely) determined at conception.
17. Id. at 357-61.
18. Parfit argues in this case that the logic of the problem is constrained by the claim that the
child's life must be at least minimally "worth living." Not everyone is convinced this argument can
be sustained, however, and even Parfit seems to think the claim is weak. At one point he says, "I
also will call certain lives 'worth living.' This description can be ignored by those who believe that
there could not be lives that are not worth living." Id. at 358.
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them into existence.' 9 Thus, on the one hand, because the potential children
in question cannot benefit by those choices or actions that bring them into
existence, the problem of contingent future persons seems to undermine moral
arguments that might motivate us to make their lives better. On the other hand,
because potential children cannot be harmed by those choices or actions that
bring them into existence, the problem seems to undermine moral arguments that
might be used to constrain those choices or actions on our part that either are
aimed at or result in making their lives worse.
Concerns for the welfare of persons routinely arise in consequentialist or
goal-based moral arguments that are based in an approach to value that is
oriented toward the interests of particular persons, whether present or future.
An approach to value is concerned with the very nature of value, with the most
basic or fundamental conditions under which value can be attributed to any
object. One such approach (of only two), discussed in the literature as a
"person-oriented" or "person-affecting" approach to value, requires, as a
condition of attributing value to an object, that a person exists for whom the
object can be valuable. This may seem like a self-obvious requirement, but the
alternative approach does not require the prior existence of persons. It is
typically discussed as an "impersonal" approach to value, and it is not
concerned with the effects of our choices or actions on particular persons. 20
In any case, when a person-oriented approach to value is used by agents in
moral arguments to make choices about present or future persons, those persons
either must already exist, or they must exist in the future independent of the
agents' choices or actions, if value is to be attributed to them. This, of course,
is exactly what is at issue with potential future persons: their existence is
dependent on or contingent on the agents' choices or actions, and thus they may
or may not exist in the future.
Further, lest we think that the problem of contingent future persons is only
an issue for person-oriented consequentialist or goal-based moral arguments, the
problem also seems to undermine what are technically referred to as personoriented deontological moral arguments. The latter are moral arguments that
need not refer to the alleged harms or benefits visited on future children as a
result of our actions, but may refer instead to something about such children as
(future) persons that requires them to be brought into existence in certain ways
or under certain circumstances-for instance, that they possess certain rights or
that certain duties or obligations are owed them. David Heyd argues
convincingly that when such deontological arguments are applied to those

19. Of course, once they come into existence, they would typically enjoy the same rights as any
other child.
20. For a more complete discussion of these two approaches, see Parfit, supra note 13; HEYD,
supra note 14; HELLER, supra note 15.
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choices or actions that bring potential children into existence, they result in a
form of moral reasoning that is "viciously circular" and thus self-defeating.21
Such arguments become circular because the problem of contingent future
persons also undermines our ability to make any direct moral reference to the
potential child who might come into existence as a result of the choices or
actions we are trying to evaluate. We can use Parfit's case again to get an
intuitive appreciation for such arguments and their implications.
Thus, in considering whether to bring a potential child into existence sooner
or later, some might argue either that the potential child has a right (as a
potential person) to be brought into existence with a basic set of opportunities
intact, or some might argue that, because of what is owed to children generally
(as persons), the couple is obligated to bring the child into existence only when
a basic set of opportunities can be guaranteed. Examples of such arguments can
be found in the NBAC's report. It discusses Hans Jonas's claim that children
have a right to "ignorance" about their futures and Joel Feinberg's claim that
children have a right to an "open future." The report also discusses Martha
Nussbaum's claim that cloning might violate some vague quality she calls
"separateness. "22
However, in all such cases, the argument becomes
hopelessly circular because the alleged subject of the rights or duties does not
yet exist as a person to whom those rights can be ascribed or those duties can
be owed. Further, and more importantly, this subject may never exist. Said
differently, because the choice or action we are trying to evaluate is the one that
makes it possible for a potential person to become a subject of rights or duties,
we cannot refer to those rights or duties when trying to decide whether to bring
that subject into existence. In such cases, agents cannot coherently make any
direct moral reference to the potential child who may or may not be brought into
existence. Heyd puts it this way: "existence is not a moral predicate; to be
cannot in itself be either good or bad, a subject of duty or prohibition, a right
or a wrong."23
Now, one may respond in a number of ways to this problem of contingent
future persons. Though none of the responses are altogether satisfying, some
mitigate the harsher implications of this problem for those potential children who
are actually brought into existence. But before we consider these responses, we
need to see how or to what extent human cloning gives rise to the problem of
contingent future persons, and we then need to review in somewhat more depth
how the problem undermines Christian moral arguments about human cloning.

21.
22.
persons
later in
23.

HEYD, supra note 14, at 39-64.
NBAC REPORT, supra note 1, at 66-67. In my estimation, the problem of contingent future
renders all such claims as highly suspect. I discuss similar, religiously-based arguments
this article. See infra Part IV.
HEYD, supra note 14, at 124.
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III.

SOMATIC CELL NUCLEAR TRANSFER CLONING IN HUMANS

Empirically, the problem of contingent future persons can arise in any
number of ways, both for individual agents and for policy makers (an important
dimension of the problem not considered here). However, as we saw above,
only one fundamental condition must be satisfied for it to arise in a general
sense: the relevant agents must be able to exercise sufficient control over the
timing of a potential child's conception such that a decision to delay conception
results in a different child-that is, a child with a different identity-actually
coming into existence."' With respect to the possibility of extending somatic
cell nuclear transfer cloning to humans, this condition can be satisfied if we
make two reasonable assumptions.
First, we must assume that the processes by which a cloned human embryo
comes into existence-that is, when the transplanted somatic nuclear material has.
been successfully reactivated-are sufficiently analogous to the natural and
artificial processes that permit the joining of a human egg and sperm, and thus
something akin to "conception." With this first assumption, we are merely
trying to locate a point in time at which we can meaningfully speak about a new
human embryo. I trust that it is not necessary to argue here, science fiction and
popular accounts of human cloning notwithstanding, that the resulting embryo
would in fact be a new biological entity. Any other position is unjustifiably
reductive. It is also not necessary that we be convinced that this new biological
entity is or is not a person, or that it does or does not deserve to be treated as
if it were a person. One's views on the moral status of these entities do not
materially affect the problem of contingent future persons. All that is required
is that we believe we have something that potentially could, given certain
conditions sufficiently under our control, become a person. If we believe the
entity in question is a person or should be treated as if it were a person, then
this belief changes what agents can justifiably do to it, but this belief does not
affect the question of whether it is harmed or benefited by being brought into
existence as that entity.
In any case, if this first assumption can be accepted, then, second, we must
assume that the relevant agents (e.g., researchers, clinicians, a gestational
mother whose consent must be obtained) can sufficiently control the timing of
this reactivation such that to change that timing would result in a different child
being born. Here, we might imagine clinicians, working under laboratory
conditions, who decide to bring a healthy child into existence through cloning,
but who then decide to delay the reactivation process, say, in order to obtain

24. The action could also result in different numbers of children being born, but this is a
complication I ignore in this article.
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better cellular material with which to work and thereby increase their chances
of having a healthy child. In such a scenario, a different child would result
(assuming, again, that transfer, gestation, and birth were successful).
Granting these two assumptions, we may conclude that human cloning can
satisfy the condition for the problem of contingent future persons to arise, at
least for some cloned children (we might also imagine scenarios associated with
human cloning that would not satisfy this condition). 5 And, if this is the case,
we are now in a position to ask whether safety can coherently serve as a moral
constraint on these actions. Said differently, if it can be demonstrated that
cloning poses risks that are higher than "normal" for a potential child that comes
into existence through cloning, can this finding count as a moral reason not to
clone this child? Or, conversely, if it can be demonstrated that cloning poses
risks that are not higher than "normal," can this finding count as a reason to
permit the cloning of this child?
Insofar as our moral concerns are directed toward the safety of the
particular potential child that might come into existence through cloning, it
should be obvious by now that the answer to both of these questions is no. The
cloned child cannot be harmed or benefited by being brought into existence in
any particular way or under any given set of circumstances, including cloning.
The problem of contingent future persons simply removes such a child from
moral consideration, and this implies that its (alleged) safety cannot coherently

25. For instance, if a cloned embryo were created, then for some reason frozen and thawed
before transfer (assuming this could be done successfully), it is arguable whether simply changing
the timing of a potential child's eventual birth (rather than its conception) would appreciably affect
the identity of the resulting child. Because the resulting child's identity is not determined simply
by its genetic make-up at conception, to make such a determination we would need to determine
whether developmental and environmental factors were sufficiently changed as to appreciably affect
its identity. This said, if the treatment of embryos that have been cloned and then frozen, thawed
and transferred to a uterus does not satisfy the necessary condition for the problem to arise, then we
are simply thrown back on more familiar types of argumentation ethically. The debate in such cases
will be about what is owed these biological entities. If we believe human personhood can be
attributed to cloned embryos or that they ought to be treated as if they were persons, then they will
have moral (and perhaps legal) claims against us, and we will have obligations to them. The point
is that future children, or the entities that will become future children, can be morally considerable
in traditional terms providing the relevant agents cannot change the identities of these future children
with the actions they are trying to evaluate. Technically, then, there are two classes of future
persons that need to be distinguished: what I call contingent future persons and non-contingent future
persons. The latter, which we are not discussing here, do not exist yet but will, and thus ought to
be treated morally like any other person is treated, with the possible exception of being subject to
a social "discount rate" because in some cases they will live in the rather distant future.
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serve as a moral constraint on the agents who control the processes by which it
is brought into existence. This same problem undermines Christian moral
arguments that refer to the potential child who might or might not be brought
into existence as a clone, and it is to these I now turn.
IV.

RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVES ON CLONING

Western religious perspectives on human cloning are summarized under
three themes in the NBAC's report: "responsible human dominion over
nature," "human dignity," and "procreation and families." Each of these
themes is correctly said to be based on or inferred from the biblical claim that
humans are created in the "image of God." I argue elsewhere, however, that
the objections to human cloning offered by Christian ethicists and moral
theologians and summarized under these three themes are not, on their own
terms, finally persuasive-that is, they fail to give Christian agents clear and
consistent moral guidance.26 For example, objections to human cloning made
under "responsible human dominion over nature" fail to tell Christians whether
human cloning ought to be regarded as an appropriate expression of the image
of God in humans or as inappropriate expression of human hubris or pride.
Objections made under "human dignity" fail to tell Christians exactly what it is
about cloning that violates human dignity. Finally, those objections made under
"procreation and families" fail to tell Christians how human cloning will
undermine the identity formation of cloned children or the relational and social
qualities of family life. 27
This being said, I here attempt to make an even stronger argument. I argue
that any Christian moral argument that attempts to refer directly to a potential
child who might or might not be cloned is undermined in principle. This
argument can be made because Christian moral arguments also assume a personoriented approach to value, which subjects them to the same limitations faced
by any other moral argument based in a person-oriented approach.
Recall that a person-oriented approach to value formally characterizes the
fundamental condition under which value can be attributed to any object, and
that condition is simply that some person must exist for whom the object can be

26. See Jan C. Heller, Religiously-BasedObjectionsto Human Cloning: Are They Sustainable?,
in BIOMEDICAL ETHICS REVIEWS: CLONING (James Humber & Robert Almeder eds., forthcoming).
27. The claim that humans are created in the image of God is probably best used to make
arguments that humans have moral responsibility and dignity. However, I believe it offers very little
direction in telling Christians how to exercise that responsibility or how to promote human dignity.
In the end, then, Christian claims about the application of somatic cell nuclear transfer cloning to
humans are probably best viewed as a set of moral intuitions seeking reasons or grounds, rather than
as moral arguments as such. Jewish and Islamic arguments may be somewhat more persuasive on
their own terms, though I am not competent to discuss those arguments in any depth.
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valuable. However, substantively, agents can employ at least two personoriented approaches to value in making moral arguments in person-oriented
terms.
These are typically discussed as anthropocentric and theocentric
approaches to value. As their names imply, an anthropocentric approach
requires the existence of some human person for value to be attributed to an
object, whereas a theocentric approach requires only the existence of a personal
God (readers not trained in theology should understand that the terms "personal"
and "existence" are used analogically in this context).
The Christian approach to value is theocentric, and thus God's existence is
all that is required for some object to be valued-as evidenced in the first
creation myth in Genesis, where God pronounces creation "good" before
humans are created. Thus, when Christian agents-because they are not God
but, as morally responsible beings, are created "like God" or in God's
"image"-are making value judgments or moral arguments about a particular
object, they must make an interpretation about how God values the object in
question. Typically, these interpretations refer to a standard set of "sources,"
such as Scripture, authoritative teaching traditions, and experience or "reason"
broadly construed. Of course, the interpretations of these sources may differ
through time and space, and even when agreement exists on their interpretations,
they may be given different weights. Thus, this process of moral "discernment"
can and often does lead to conflicting interpretations about how God values a
particular object. Nevertheless, about persons in general, the Christian tradition
is clear. Human persons and the conditions under which they exist are thought
to be of central importance to God and to God's purposes for the world. The
centrality of human persons to God's purposes is one reason why Christians
(along with Jews and Muslims) do not debate whether a cloned human child
would, in fact, be a person. It is also one reason why the safety of these cloned
human children is-intuitively, at least-so very important to Christians.
But we must remind ourselves that we are not inquiring about what is owed
a cloned human child that already exists; rather, we are asking whether what is
owed such a child can be used to evaluate those choices or actions that brought
it into existence. Unfortunately, the answer again is no, for Christian moral
arguments that use a theocentric approach to value are subject to the same
limitations we saw above: they cannot make any direct reference to the child
who might be brought into existence by a particular choice or action.
Imagine what might be required of Christian agents to overcome such
limitations. In order to argue that some potential child ought or ought not be
brought into existence because it was "conceived" by cloning (and thus might
suffer certain harms, enjoy certain benefits, or have certain rights violated
thereby), Christians would need to produce an interpretation of how God valued
one potential child's existence over some other (or no) potential child's
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existence. I cannot see how such an argument could be made, especially if we
assume, as most Christians do, that God values persons equally-when they
become persons-because all are created in the image of God. Potential
children, of course, do not possess the image of God, because they are not yet
persons. Moreover, if an interpretation could be made that God does, in fact,
value some potential children more than others (say, because they are "chosen"
by God in a covenant ceremony with their ancestors), then the Christian agents
in question would still need to tell us how they know that God values these and
not those particular potential children, all of whom could be included in a set of
the "chosen." And finally, if we were persuaded that these Christian agents do
indeed know which particularpotential children God values from a set of the
chosen, the status of the potential children in question would simply change from
that of potential or contingent future persons, about whom some choice for
existence or non-existence must be made, to "actual" (Heyd's term) or "noncontingent" future persons (my term), about whom no choice is required for
existence. In other words, we are no longer concerned with potential children,
but future children who will come into existence because God has determined
it. By that determination, then, they are rendered morally considerable as future
persons in ways that potential persons are not.
The point, of course, is that Christians simply cannot refer directly to the
potential children who might or might not exist, and even if they, in some way,
can claim to know the intentions of God in this regard, this knowledge would
simply change the status of the future persons in question and render them actual
or non-contingent future persons. Thus, the problem of contingent future
persons truly undermines all references to these potential persons by Christians,
and this includes references to their safety made in consequentialist or goalbased moral arguments as well as references to a potential child made in
deontological rights-based or duty-based moral arguments.
V.

SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR ARGUMENTS ABOUT HUMAN CLONING

Now, what implications does the above discussion hold for the substantive
arguments that are made by Christians about cloning and summarized in the
NBAC's report? Note that not all arguments made by Christians about human
cloning refer to potential cloned children, and thus only some of the arguments
developed under the three themes are relevant to the discussion here. For
example, warnings not to "play God" are problematic because they are too
indeterminate, not because they necessarily refer to the potential child that might
be created by cloning. That is, these warnings do not tell us whether creating
a cloned child is inappropriately playing God or, as one theologian notes, quite
appropriately "playing human" (by which he means that cloning could be viewed
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as an acceptable expression of God's "image" and creativity in human
beings).2" The same could be said about the discussions of "the quest for
knowledge" and of "human destiny." Here, Christian moral arguments are
again too indeterminate. Christians cannot, on the basis of these arguments,
decide whether the quest for knowledge about human cloning is appropriate or
inappropriate, or whether being created in the image of God imparts to them a
destiny that includes or excludes such technological achievements as human
cloning. However, this being said, the arguments about the relationship of
humans to the rest of creation and arguments about human dignity deserve more
comment. These two issues will illustrate in more depth the implications of
Christian moral arguments that attempt to refer to a potential child.
The NBAC's report discusses, under the heading of "responsible
dominion," three "models" or ways of interpreting the biblical claim that
humans are to exercise "dominion... over every living thing that moveth upon
the earth."29 The three models discussed, from least to most permissive, are
"stewardship," "partnership," and "created co-creators." 3 They represent
three competing interpretations of the meaning of being created in God's image.
Now, I do not believe it is possible to decide, on scriptural grounds, which
model ought to "trump" the others; nevertheless, Christian agents using one of
these models might have occasion to make moral arguments about future
persons. For example, it might be argued that being a good steward requires
agents to consider the rights of future children to a world with certain resources
intact. But, on the basis of the discussion above, I suggest that arguments about
stewardship cannot be made with respect to potential children at all, whether
created through cloning or by natural means. They cannot be said to have
interests or rights, nor can Christians plausibly be said to have duties or
obligations to them.
This said, Christians can plausibly claim that their tradition gives them
reasons to be good stewards of creation generally. And in being good stewards
in this general sense, resources might be protected for anyone who is born in the
future, and this might be good for the potential children who are actually
brought into existence. Nevertheless, it could not be a reason to bring or not
to bring these potential children into the world. Moreover, if a "hard choice"

28. NBAC REPORT, supra note 1, at 44-49 (citing TED PETERS, PLAYING GOD? GENETIC
DISCRIMINATION AND HUMAN FREEDOM (1997)).

29. Genesis 1:28 (KJV).
30. NBAC REPORT, supra note 1, at 46-47.
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had to be made between expending resources for the currently living or for
future actual or non-contingent persons and potential persons who may or may
not exist, these potential persons could make no claim on Christians. Similar
conclusions can be drawn about the claim that cloning violates the "dignity" of
potential children.
Some Christians have claimed that cloning violates human dignity. One
Roman Catholic commentator, quoted in the NBAC's report, argues that human
cloning would violate human dignity because it would "jeopardize the personal
and unique identity of the clone (or clones) as well as the person whose genome
was thus duplicated." 3" Again, I believe this argument is hard to sustain on its
own terms; that is, I do not believe a credible argument can be advanced to
show how being a clone would jeopardize the "personal and unique" identity of
the cloned child, much less the person whose genome is cloned. The argument
is philosophically reductive, and it overlooks the many non-genetic factors
involved in forming human identity.
Nevertheless, even if this claim were not reductive, it could still be
interpreted in at least two ways that are relevant for my purposes. First, the
claim that cloning violates human dignity could be a claim that the rights of a
potential child not to be cloned have been violated when that potential child is
brought into existence as a clone. If this is what the claim means, then we saw
above that it cannot be sustained. It leads to a self-defeating, circular argument.
Second, the claim could refer to some "objective" moral norm or standard that
is part of the "natural law" given by God to humans to guide their choices and
actions. This second type of claim needs to be sorted out a bit, and again
Heyd's work is helpful.
Heyd argues that we must distinguish between an objectivity of value "that
exists independent of 'any mind whatsoever'" and an objectivity of value that
is a "common standard 'valid for all minds.'"32 The former is a reference to
the "nature of value" and as such refers to the impersonal approach to value.
The latter is a reference to the "perspective" agents ought to adopt in trying to
ground particular value judgments and as such refers to the claim that such
grounds ought to be common for all agents.
Now, insofar as the claim that cloning objectively violates human dignity
is a claim that value exists independently of any mind, including God's, this is
a claim about the impersonal nature of value and, as such, is incompatible with
a person-oriented theocentric approach to value. But of course, for a Roman

31. Id. at 50.
32. HEYD, supra note 14, at 82.
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Catholic commentator, it is not this sort of claim. Thus, insofar as it is a claim
about how value judgments ought to be justified, it is a claim that is entirely
compatible with the tradition, though not one that is universally shared by all
adherents. Our question, then, is whether the objectivity of value, as it is used
in this context, can overcome the problem of contingent future persons.
Unfortunately, it cannot. For even if all agents agreed to treat value in
objective terms, the potential persons in question can have value for these agents
in person-oriented terms only after they are brought into existence. Any other
argument, as we saw above, becomes hopelessly circular.
Analogous claims can be made about the other arguments advanced by
Christians and summarized in the NBAC's report, but these two examples are
enough to demonstrate how the discussion would proceed. Thus, the problem
of contingent future persons seems to leave Christians in a very ambiguous
situation morally, for it is counter-intuitive that the choices or actions that hold
such dramatic implications for the well-being of some future child cannot be
subject to moral constraint. What we need to consider now is whether any
responses overcome or get around the problem of contingent future persons.
That is, are there responses that Christians could offer that would make this
situation less ambiguous? There are, but as I suggested above, none of them is
altogether satisfying.
VI.

SOME POSSIBLE RESPONSES

The first response is perhaps the least satisfying in moral terms and the
most satisfying in rational terms. It is simply to accept the logic of the problem
of contingent future persons and claim, on the basis of this logic, that agents
have a carte blanche with regard to the choices or actions that bring future
children into existence. If such children cannot be harmed or benefited by the
choices or actions that bring them into existence, then agents are simply and
utterly unconstrained with respect to these children. But most philosophers and
ethicists (though not all) 33 reject this response, for it leaves those potential
children brought into existence without any moral protection. Christians are
likely to reject it as well and for the same reason. This response also assumes
that all moral constraints must be person-oriented, and this is not true, as the
second possible response suggests.
The second response requires that Christians abandon the person-oriented
theocentric approach to value that is assumed in their moral arguments, and
adopt in its place the one and only alternative approach mentioned above,
namely, the impersonal approach. The impersonal approach to value does permit

33. NBAC REPORT, supra note 1, at 66 n.2.
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agents to consider directly the existence of potential persons as variables in their
moral considerations, though not as future persons as such (for it too is subject
to the problem of contingent future persons), but as persons who might possess
or embody certain values that agents impersonally intend to realize or maximize.
Thus, for agents using an impersonal approach, the safety of potential children
might be a value that agents would want to maximize in any choice or action
that brings such children into existence, even though the safety of particular
potential persons brought into existence could not be a relevant value. These
agents might argue, for example, that safety ought to be maximized for
whomever is brought into existence, by whatever means, and if safety cannot be
assured in human cloning, then agents ought not to clone children until it can be.
An impersonal argument of this type, however, is extremely problematic
for Christians (and for Jews and Muslims too, though I do not consider those
traditions here). Most problematic for Christians is the theological implication
of an impersonal approach to value. This approach does not require the
existence of a God who is the author or source of value, for the impersonal
approach, considered theologically, implies that God is subject (like other
agents) to some impersonal scheme of value, rather than being the author or
source of value. Christians are not likely to be persuaded to adopt such an
approach to value that undermines some of their most basic beliefs about God
as the Creator.
Joel Feinberg suggests a third possible response. He is concerned with how
we, in a liberal society, ought morally to justify legal constraints on agents who
might deliberately or carelessly produce children under less than optimal
conditions (what Feinberg calls "welfare-connected non-grievance evils"). 3
His moral arguments clearly fall under what I discussed above as a personoriented deontological argument; that is, he is concerned generally with the
interests and rights of particular persons that ought to be safeguarded in a liberal
society. In any case, Feinberg essentially treats cases involving potential
children who might "negligently" be brought into the world as a special case,
one falling outside the usual moral constraints of liberalism, but nonetheless
requiring legal constraint in a liberal society. Indeed, he recommends that we
carve out a "clear categorical exception" to liberalism for such cases. Thus,
Feinberg acknowledges that it makes no sense to claim that bringing such
children into the world harms them, though he still wants to claim that the
interests of such children have been adversely affected by being born and,
thereby, forced to exist in a "harmful condition." The moral argument he
proposes against such "harmless wrongdoing" is that it "wantonly introduces a

34. See JOEL FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOING, 4 THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL
LAW 25-33, 325-28 (1988).
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certain amount of avoidable human suffering [elsewhere he says 'evil'] into the
world."'
Now, by Feinberg's own admission, this response to the problem of
contingent future persons is an "untidy solution." Unfortunately, I do not
believe it is a solution at all. For an agent to be blamed morally, -and perhaps
even held criminally liable, for deliberately or negligently bringing a child into
existence under less than optimal conditions because it introduces an avoidable
"suffering" or "evil" into the world imposes an impersonal solution on a
problem that Feinberg originally poses in person-oriented terms. Indeed, in a
later article, he seems to acknowledge this possibility.-' Nevertheless, the two
fundamental approaches to value are exhaustive and mutually exclusive.37
Thus, it may indeed be evil to bring such children into existence when it can be
avoided, but it can be evil only in impersonal terms. It cannot be evil in personoriented terms, at least for the child produced, even if he or she suffers
tragically. The child has been neither harmed nor wronged by being brought
into existence under less than optimal conditions, and the fact that this is
counter-intuitive for Feinberg (and, indeed, for most us) does not make it any
less true. In person-oriented terms, a future child can be "wronged" only if its
future existence is not contingent in the relevant sense, and irrationally mixing
person-oriented and impersonal approaches to value when "special cases" arise
will inevitably lead to conflict situations where a choice between the two
approaches will be forced.38
A fourth response is available to Christians, however. Morally, it requires
that Christians consider the existence of potential children indirectly. This
option is also suggested by David Heyd's work. 39 By treating potential
children indirectly, Heyd acknowledges that potential children cannot be
considered directly (or as such) in person-oriented terms. Treating them
indirectly implies that we can consider potential children only from the

35. Id. at 326.
36. See Joel Feinberg, Wrongfil Life and the CounterfactualElement in Harming, I SOcIAL
PHIL. & POL'Y 4, 174 n.29 (1986). 1 want to thank Professor Bonnie Steinbock for directing me
to Feinberg's texts, though the interpretations of them are entirely my own.
37. See HEYD, supra note 14, at 80-90.
38. Having said this, I should point out that Feinberg's so-called solution is not an uncommon
one; indeed, it may be the solution adopted by the NBAC in its short discussion of Parfit's nonidentity problem. NBAC REPORT, supra note 1, at 66 n.2. This solution amounts to asserting, in
the face of the problem of contingent future persons, that potential children can be harmed or
wronged by being brought into existence. Yes, it is true, as the report claims, that Parfit is unhappy
with his own conclusions about the non-identity problem. But that does not make the problem less
of a problem for him, or for us.
39. See generally HEYD, supra note 14. I develop this option for Christians in more depth in
Heller, supra note 8.
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perspective of otherpersons who may be affected positively or negatively by the
choices or actions that bring these potential children into existence. These
"other persons" could include the agents that bring them into existence; they
could include groups of persons, even society in general, who may be forced to
bear the opportunity costs of the choice to clone humans or the costs of human
cloning experiments that are not entirely successful; and, finally, they could
even include actual or non-contingent future persons whose existence does not
depend on the choices or actions in the relevant sense, but whose interests will
be affected in some way by them.
However, the indirect treatment of the choices and actions that bring
potential persons into existence is not without its own limitations. It assumes
that what matters morally are those present and future persons affected by the
existence of the potential persons. Thus, if potential cloned persons are to be
protected as they come into existence, the persons affected by that choice must
have interests in seeing that the cloned child has the best set of opportunities and
the best overall health that science can provide. In other words, it assumes that
most agents will not want to produce a cloned child that is not at least as well
off (statistically) as most naturally conceived children are at birth. This will be
a safe assumption in the vast majority of cases, but there may be exceptions.
For example, suppose agents are less interested in the product of their cloning
efforts and more interested, say, in perfecting the techniques of cloning or in
their own professional advancement. Such agents may not have a strong enough
interest in being careful with the life they produce and thus might produce a
cloned child who is born with a considerably reduced set of opportunities in life.
Of course, other persons, such as the prospective parents, may be harmed or
wronged by such carelessness, and these persons would then possibly have a
claim against these agents. The fear of such a claim might work indirectly to
protect potential cloned children brought into existence through these agents'
research. Thus, the indirect response does offer some moral guidance for
Christian agents, as well as some indirect protection to cloned children. What
it does not offer-and this is the point, of course-is any direct way to reference
the potential child who might or might not be brought into existence by human
cloning. A potential cloned child has no moral standing in traditional personoriented theocentric terms until after it is brought into existence.
VII. CONCLUSION

This Article has argued that the problem of contingent future persons
undermines, in principle, those Christian moral arguments that permit human
cloning on the assumption that the question of safety has been adequately
addressed, as well as those that prohibit human cloning by reference to the rights
of a potential cloned child or to the duties or obligations owed a potential cloned
child. A potential cloned child cannot be harmed or benefited by being brought
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into existence as a clone, and neither can it be wronged. However, because
Christian moral arguments are fundamentally person-oriented or person-affecting
and theocentric and hold persons to be central to God's purposes for the world,
these arguments can refer to potential cloned children indirectly. Stated
differently, they can refer to those present and non-contingent future persons
who are affected by bringing a potential cloned child into existence. Such
indirect reference offers some, albeit limited, protection to those potential cloned
children actually brought into existence, and, in some cases, it may be enough
to constrain agents altogether. If not, however, there is little more that
Christians can offer morally.
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